Heidegger's Critique of Edmund Husserl's Concept of Intentionality

The term intentionality took a different stand in the contemporary epoch, thanks to the ingenuity of Edmund Husserl who took it to a different level unlike how it's been conceived right in the ancient time. Philosophers have explained what intentionality represents. One thing very common is that it involves directness of the mental state or states to a particular object or objects. It is consciousness of something. This mode of thinking is not recent in philosophy. This book simply focuses on how Husserl and Heidegger conceived the term and the critiques that Heidegger had against Husserl. Re-visiting those critiques is the primary onus of this work. I will contend that Heidegger was instead more interested in another sort of phenomenology (that which focuses on the re-establishing the forgotten question of Being) than that of Husserl which concentrates on analysing consciousness and its directness to a particular object; consciousness as far it is intentional. von Udeji, Anthony Azubuike