Nutzen der ökonomischen Theorie der Politik für eine Konkretisierung des Gebotes innerparteilicher D
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Beschreibung
Political parties have a wide discretion in forming inner-party decision-making. The question is, whether the legal requirements towards the command of inner-party democracy in Art. 21 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG) are appropriate. Brettschneider looks at this issue from the perspective of the Economic Theory of Democracy and models the behavior of politicians as a competition of self-interested politicians. He considers the legal requirements towards the command of inner-party democracy as a framework of competition (Wettbewerbsordnung) for the inner-party competition of politicians. He shows that equality of the conditions in this competition is not ensured on the basis of the existing legal requirements. In a second step he considers the static and dynamic functions of inner-party competition and infers from it that an intensive inner-party competition is desirable in principle. On the basis of these considerations he concludes that the hitherto existing legal requirements on inner-party democracy are inappropriate.
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