Nutzen der ökonomischen Theorie der Politik für eine Konkretisierung des Gebotes innerparteilicher D
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Beschreibung
Political parties have a wide discretion in forming inner-party decision-making. The question is, whether the legal requirements towards the command of inner-party democracy in Art. 21 Abs. 1 Satz 3 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG) are appropriate. Brettschneider looks at this issue from the perspective of the Economic Theory of Democracy and models the behavior of politicians as a competition of self-interested politicians. He considers the legal requirements towards the command of inner-party democracy as a framework of competition (Wettbewerbsordnung) for the inner-party competition of politicians. He shows that equality of the conditions in this competition is not ensured on the basis of the existing legal requirements. In a second step he considers the static and dynamic functions of inner-party competition and infers from it that an intensive inner-party competition is desirable in principle. On the basis of these considerations he concludes that the hitherto existing legal requirements on inner-party democracy are inappropriate.
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Über den Autor
Jörg Brettschneider ist Rechtsanwalt in Hamburg. Er studierte Jura an der Bucerius Law School in Hamburg und der University of Cambridge. Anschließend war er Referendar im Landgerichtsbezirk Flensburg. Im Jahr 2013 hat Brettschneider an der Bucerius Law S
- Hardcover
- 282 Seiten
- Erschienen 2020
- Routledge
- Hardcover
- 314 Seiten
- Open University Press
- Hardcover
- 248 Seiten
- Cambridge University Press