Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems) (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 412, Band 412)
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Beschreibung
This book takes three different approaches to the two-person bargaining problem with incomplete information: The game theoretic analysis, the study of the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment, and the investigation of strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects in a strategy experiment. The two different experimental approaches allow to study the bargaining behavior which emerges spontaneously in interactive plays of two subjects, and moreover the instructions experienced subjects give to a representative. The three approaches together provide a vivid picture of theoretical and experimentally observed behavior in the two-person bargaining problem. The synopsis of these different approaches is a novelty in the analysis of boundedly rational behavior.
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